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Professor Vassiliev holds the view that some of our systems of formal logic, in
particular, the syllogistic, the propositional calculus, and the predicate calculus,
are the appropriate tools for constructing and evaluating scientific and
everyday argumentation. There are some features of these systems, and of our
argumentation that make them less useful than they may seem.
The main problem is that much argumentation produced by human beings is
logically satisfactory but tests out as defective using these systems. This is
because they can only detect formal validity and invalidity, but arguers are not
attempting to produce formally valid inferences. They are instead trying to
provide sufficient evidence for their conclusions.
For example, people hardly ever cast their reasoning in syllogistic form, even
when they can. Instead, they support their conclusion by giving only what counts
as the minor premiss of the syllogism. (Example: "Elvis was a man, so Elvis
was mortal.") Such arguments only have the potential for being valid if we
impute the appropriate major premiss to the arguer, but it is surely a serious
deficiency in an evaluation procedure if additional claims have to be imputed
to the arguer before the evaluation can begin.
The propositional calculus also has practical deficiencies as an evaluation tool.
One arises from the fact that it, and the predicate calculus too, is a proof
procedure, not a decision procedure. We can identify formally valid inferences
with it, but not invalid ones. A failure to construct a proof for a conclusion using
the stated premisses does not guarantee that the inference is invalid. It may
only be that we were not clever enough to discover a proof. (Symbolic logic
texts implicitly admit this deficiency when they furnish only valid patterns for
evaluation.)
Another practical limitation of propositional logic is one not frequently noted by
those who advocate its use in evaluating arguments in everyday language. An
argument can only be valid in this system if it contains at least one conditional
or one disjunction. Now if you scan the editorial and opinion pages of reputable
newspapers, for example, you will find surprisingly few conditionals and
disjunctions, but many arguments. This means it is pointless to test most such
arguments for formal validity using propositional logic, since almost all of them
are invalid, and we know this in advance.
Informal research of the above kind is sufficient to show what the main
drawback is in using formal logic tests for everyday argument: almost all such
argument is based on the concept of evidence. A good argument has
premisses that make its conclusion probable enough to warrant regarding it as
true. What counts as enough evidence depends on the content of the
conclusion, so it is not possible to formulate broad criteria for evaluating
everyday inferences. Nevertheless, there are a limited number of kinds of
claims (obligation, evaluative, empirical, etc.) so that some standards can be
identified for inferring them.
A second topic of interest in Professor Vassiliev's paper is found in his
comments on how we acquire the logical competence needed to reliably judge
the soundness of inferences. He states quite correctly that an evaluator "needs
to know the rules of inference", but I think he takes this to involve learning the
three logic systems already discussed.
There is no doubt that a fully competent evaluator and reasoner will know
enough to identify and avoid committing the more common formal fallacies. A
person who cannot distinguish the basic valid and invalid patterns involving
conditionals does not have an adequate concept of a conditional, which is a
powerful thinking tool. However, as those who teach critical thinking can attest,
one does not need to learn propositional logic to master the concept. (Indeed,
the technical concept is so different from the everyday one that learning it can
undermine one's grasp of the latter.) Similarly, one does not need to learn
predicate calculus to be able to detect fallacies of division and conversion.
These too can be learned ad hoc.
Since most reasoning is evidential, one must acquire competence by learning
what counts as good evidence for the kinds of claims one is interested in
arguing for. The process is not unlike (because related to) language learning,
or learning a new sport. For example, very few soccer players can recite all the
rules governing the playing of their game. They learn to play in accordance with
the rules by imitating others who play, and getting feedback on their deviations.
(Example: the goalkeeper says "That's not a goal, you were offside!") Because
the rules are normative, we try to correct our errors on future occasions.
Something like this happens in learning to construct arguments. People tell us
on occasion that we haven't given enough evidence, or that we have made a
logical error. In general, then, people can learn enough logic to get by in the
course of trying to persuade others. Mastery of the formal systems will
undoubtedly help us avoid formal errors better, but to my mind the effort
needed to keep up one's competence bars this approach for most people.
And of course these systems do not help us in doing evidential reasoning, the
most common kind.
If formal systems are not efficient tools for evaluating everyday argument and
scientific reasoning, how should we proceed? For it is important that we do
such evaluation.
The first step is to be able to depict the logical structure of an argument. In
informal logic circles, the depiction device favored for monological cases is a
diagram that links the propositions that constitute the argument. Letters stand
for propositions, and arrows connect propositions to those for which they are
evidence. In the course of constructing a diagram, one needs to identify the
role of each proposition and here Toulmin's model is the best resource, as
Professor Vassilev recognizes, although one can do pretty well just by looking
for what is evidence for what.
Once we have the argument correctly depicted, we begin with the conclusion
that is most logically remote from the final/main conclusion and determine how
probable it is as a result of the premisses furnished to prove it. This is the
product of the probability of the conclusion given the truth of its premisses and
the joint probability of the premisses. The final judgment is the probability of the
final/main conclusion given the argument.
For dialogical scenarios, additional concepts are needed to classify the
propositions, and Professor Vassiliev provides us with a set consisting of
"elements", "steps", and "moves". Perhaps he can work through an example
for us during the discussion period.
 
